Presentation within the Roundtable “Possibility of Introducing a Proportional Electoral System with Direct Candidate Voting in Serbia: Advantages and Disadvantages”
The Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) began its public campaign for electoral reform as early as 2005. It became clear then that ensuring a high-quality electoral process requires far more than transparent ballot boxes, control slips, sprays, and UV lamps; meaningful change demands structural reform of the entire system rather than isolated adjustments at polling stations. Consequently, in 2007, CeSID put forward a reform proposal advocating for a variant of a proportional system with direct candidate voting, closely resembling the Slovenian model promoted today by the Foundation for Liberal Public Policy.
Regarding the stance of Serbian political parties toward electoral reform, a broad consensus existed in 2009 among key actors to revise the existing system through a new Law on the Election of Members of Parliament. However, when implementation was due, the initiative was abruptly shelved for unknown reasons and removed from public discourse.
As part of CeSID’s original reform proposal, an initial pilot project was envisioned across several local self-government units to observe the practical advantages and disadvantages of the new electoral design. Unfortunately, this initiative likewise failed to secure broader consensus among political parties, illustrating the general reluctance of political organizations in Serbia to alter the status quo in this domain.
Positive public attitudes toward political parties represent a vital guarantor of political system stability. However, research conducted by CeSID since 2010 consistently indicates that average public trust in political parties remains at roughly 10%, reaching a historical peak of only 15%—lower than trust levels recorded for any other institution or social actor. While only one in ten citizens expresses trust in political parties, the ruling party simultaneously claims a membership of 700,000. This creates a paradox where numerous party members explicitly report a lack of confidence in party operations. This dynamic demonstrates that citizens predominantly view parties as instruments for personal, material, and professional advancement rather than guardians of the public interest. Furthermore, this distrust propagates to broader state institutions, including parliament and the government, positioning political parties as primary drivers of institutional distrust in society.
Introducing a proportional electoral system with direct candidate voting would introduce several structural improvements to the functioning of parliament and political parties:
- Direct Accountability to Voters: MPs directly elected within specific constituencies would establish a tangible connection with their electorate, fostering greater caution in parliamentary decision-making. Representatives could no longer rely on party leaders for protection, having to demonstrate efficacy directly to their constituents to secure re-election.
- Cultivation of a Competitive Political Elite: Over two or three election cycles, the system incentivizes the emergence of a genuine “electoral political elite.” Under current conditions, centralized party structures discourage the development of competent leaders, as decision-making remains concentrated around top leadership figures who often marginalize potential rivals. Direct mandates provide individuals with independent popular legitimacy, strengthening their capacity to reform party programs and foster internal party democratization.
While the proposed proportional system with direct candidate voting is not without flaws, systemic transformation rarely occurs instantaneously. Over several election cycles, political actors will adapt to the incentives established by the new framework. Personalizing the electoral system represents a meaningful structural advancement in a landscape that has seen mostly cosmetic adjustments prior to elections over the past two decades.