Reform of the Political System

    Framework Recommendations for the Reform of the Electoral System in Serbia

    The Political System of Serbia and Its Deficiencies

    For over 30 years, the design of the political system in Serbia has incentivized authoritarian political behavior and culture. Imprecise or flawed regulation governing executive, legislative, and electoral institutions allows political actors to exceed their constitutional mandates, exploit regulatory loopholes, and evade oversight.

    At all levels, the system favors politicians accountable to party leaders and covert private interests rather than to citizens. Negative selection—driven by strict party discipline and personal loyalty—remains widespread, adversely impacting the public.

    For these reasons, reforming the political system is a top priority for the Foundation for Liberal Practical Policy (Fondacija za liberalnu praktičnu politiku – FLPP). Comprehensive structural reform is essential for building a functional, stable, and sustainable democratic system with high social trust and civic participation. Any democratic change without deep institutional reform will remain superficial and short-lived.

    The FLPP advocates for a four-pillar reform of the political system:

    1. Personalization of the electoral system.
    2. Strengthening the oversight role of parliament relative to the executive branch.
    3. Expanding mechanisms for direct citizen participation in political decision-making.
    4. Decentralization and adopting a regional state model.

    The Need for Electoral System Reform

    Free and fair elections serve as the primary institutional mechanism for resolving societal conflicts, distributing political power peacefully, and ensuring the alternating transfer of power.

    Members of Parliament (MPs) in Serbia are currently elected under a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system in a single nation-wide constituency, introduced by the 2000 Law on the Election of Representatives. While subsequent legislative updates addressed procedural elements, the core design of the system remained unchanged.

    The most visible flaw in this framework is severe geographic underrepresentation:

    • Following the April 2022 parliamentary elections, 102 out of 174 municipalities and cities (58.6%) in Serbia had no local resident representative in the National Assembly.
    • This leaves nearly 1.3 million registered voters (1,271,988) without direct local representation in parliament. Excluding Kosovo and Metohija, 77 out of 145 local self-government units (53.1%) and 1.18 million voters lack direct representation.
    • Metropolitan Overrepresentation: Following the 2022 elections, 105 MPs resided in Belgrade alone. While Belgrade accounts for 24.6% of registered voters, it received 42% of parliamentary seats.
    • Belgrade and Novi Sad combined account for 129 seats (over 50%), despite representing only 29.7% of the total electorate. Novi Sad gained 24 MPs—its highest allocation in 20 years.
    • Regional Disparities: While Belgrade and Vojvodina together hold 159 seats (63.6%), 29 out of 47 municipalities (61.7%) in Southern and Eastern Serbia lack an MP. Even in Vojvodina, 53.3% of municipalities have no local parliamentary representation.
    • In the 2022 elections, three municipalities had zero candidates across all 19 electoral lists: Irig, Varvarin, and Ražanj.

    Historically, research demonstrates a persistent structural trend:

    • According to Prof. Milan Jovanović (FPN), an average of 100 municipalities lacked representationacross assembly convocations following the 2000, 2003, 2007, and 2008 elections. Furthermore, 17 severely underdeveloped municipalities had no representatives across eight consecutive legislatures.
    • Research by CeSID showed that 96 municipalities (1.5 million voters) lacked an MP from 2014 to 2016, increasing to 107 municipalities (1.6 million voters) between 2016 and 2020.

    When voters cannot cast a direct vote for individual candidates by name, the link between citizens and elected representatives breaks. MPs become accountable to party headquarters—which control list placement—rather than to local constituencies. This dynamic eliminates genuine parliamentary debate, reduces oversight of the executive branch, and aligns legislative interests with opaque power centers rather than the public.

    Personalization of the Electoral System

    The FLPP advocates transitioning to a personalized proportional representation system with direct voting for individual candidates, modeled closely on Slovenia’s electoral framework.

    Under this system:

    • Voters directly select individual candidates representing their specific electoral district by name.
    • Proportionality is preserved: seats are allocated to parties, coalitions, or civic groups based on their total vote share.
    • Individual seats are awarded to party candidates who achieve the highest vote percentages within their local districts based on personal reputation and candidate performance.

    This design ensures geographic representation across all regions, enforces representative accountability to local electorates, and promotes internal democratic competition within political parties.

    Concrete Framework Recommendations

    The FLPP research team developed these framework recommendations using a multi-method methodology:

    • Analysis of systemic flaws observed during the April 2022 parliamentary and local elections.
    • Comparative evaluation of electoral systems in advanced democracies and neighboring countries (specifically evaluating Slovenia’s model via analysis by Prof. Dušan Vučićević).
    • Review of public opinion polling on electoral reform conducted by CRTA and CeSID.
    • Consultations with domestic political science experts and academic roundtables.

    Core Reform Proposals:

    1. New Electoral Legislation: Enact a new Law on the Election of Representatives introducing a personalized proportional representation system with direct candidate voting.
    2. Seven Multi-Member Constituencies: Divide Serbia’s territory into 7 multi-member constituencies to allocate the 250 parliamentary seats based on population:
      • Belgrade
      • Vojvodina (e.g., 64 seats)
      • Šumadija
      • Western Serbia
      • Southern Serbia
      • Eastern Serbia
      • Kosovo and Metohija
    3. 250 Single-Member Districts: Subdivide the 7 constituencies into 250 single-member districts (e.g., Vojvodina’s 64 seats would map to 64 districts: 12 in Novi Sad, 5 in Subotica, 4 in Zrenjanin, 4 in Pančevo, etc.). Each district elects one MP.
    4. Candidate Nomination Rules: Parties, coalitions, or civic groups nominate individual candidates across single-member districts rather than submitting closed party lists. Parties must field candidates in at least one-third of all districts (waived for national minority parties).
    5. Personalized Ballot Design: Voters receive a ballot listing the names of all individual candidates in their specific district alongside their nominating party or coalition. Voters cast a single vote for their preferred individual candidate.
    6. Ballot Order Determination: Determine candidate sequence on ballots via random draw rather than submission speed.
    7. Signature Gathering: Require a minimum of 30 voter signatures per candidate within their specific district instead of centralized party-wide signature gathering.
    8. Proportional Allocation Formula: Maintain overall proportionality using the d’Hondt method with a 35% quotient increase, or replace it with the Sainte-Laguë formula.
    9. National Minority Representation: Determine minority party seats using the most favorable of two criteria:
      • Natural threshold applied at the national level.
      • Awarding seats in any district where the minority candidate wins a plurality.
    10. Reserved Seats for Minorities: Consider establishing up to 5 reserved seats for smaller or historically unrepresented national minorities (e.g., Croats, Romanians, Slovaks, Roma).
    11. Internal Seat Distribution: Allocate a party’s won seats to its individual candidates based on their district performance, measured by the percentage of total registered voters won in their respective districts.
    12. Triple-Guarantee Gender Quota (40% Minimum):
      • Nomination: At least 40% of a party’s total fielded candidates nationwide must be women.
      • Allocation: At least 40% of seats won by any party must be assigned to female candidates.
      • Replacement: If a female MP resigns, her seat must be filled by the next highest-performing female candidate from the party who was not initially elected.

    This document serves as an initial framework to encourage debate among democratic political parties, civil society organizations, and policy experts to build broad consensus for electoral system reform in Serbia.

    Research Team, Foundation for Liberal Public Policy