Presentation within the Roundtable “Possibility of Introducing a Proportional Electoral System with Direct Candidate Voting in Serbia: Advantages and Disadvantages”
The proportional electoral system with a single nationwide constituency and closed, blocked lists—as currently exists in Serbia—exerts a distinctly negative impact on balanced geographical representation in parliament, effectively preventing citizens outside Belgrade from having genuine representatives. Across multiple consecutive parliamentary convocations, Belgrade has been represented by over 100 MPs, reaching a record high of 117. Geographical representation established in this manner within the supreme legislative body further dictates the distribution of economic power, facilitating a financial draw of resources from the periphery to the center.
Furthermore, the present system denies any meaningful autonomy to elected representatives from other cities in relation to party headquarters in Belgrade. For instance, in Niš, the third-largest city in Serbia by population, there is not a single MP, local government official, or local councillor capable of independently and freely making decisions concerning their city. This extends so far that party cadres from Belgrade dictate hiring decisions for individual school positions in Niš. This undermines a fundamental civic right: the ability to elect an individual within one’s own community who remains directly accountable to those voters, ensuring representation by individuals judged to possess the requisite qualifications.
Introducing a proportional electoral system with direct candidate voting would generate numerous positive effects, initiating long-overdue progress in this domain. The objective must extend beyond analyzing current conditions to setting long-term positive trends in motion. Any meaningful improvement of the electoral system must ensure that citizens residing outside Belgrade feel a tangible sense of influence. Personalization will re-establish the bond between elected officials and the electorate.
Such a reform would establish system parameters ensuring that party candidates no longer prioritize securing a “winnable” spot on a party list from central leadership. Instead, candidates would be required to justify party platform choices and personal results directly to constituents in their electoral unit to secure support. Concurrently, the fear among MPs of losing re-election opportunities or being removed from party posts for departing from central directives would cease to be the primary driving factor.
Beyond the method of electing members of parliament, electoral systems at the local self-government level also require alteration. The closed-list proportional system is flawed in itself, but replicating this identical structure from the national level down to municipalities—applying the exact same system across vastly different environments, from Crna Trava to Belgrade—compounds these shortcomings.
As an initial step within comprehensive electoral reform, officials elected at the local level who manage core services—such as sanitation, water supply, road infrastructure, electricity, and local schooling—must become directly accessible to citizens. Crucially, a mayor or municipal president should answer primarily to local voters rather than to a party leader.
Regrettably, the space for discussing potential electoral system changes in Serbia remains constrained given the severe degradation of the electoral process itself. The system experienced a breakdown in 2016, when registered irregularities in parliamentary and local elections exceeded 5%, subsequently rising to between 16% and 17% in recent elections. Under such conditions, it remains uncertain whether altering the electoral system alone would yield substantive results.