Presentation within the Roundtable “Mechanisms of Participatory Democracy as a Response to the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century”
Most conclusions regarding the attitudes of Serbian citizens towards democracy and democratic institutions can be drawn from a decade-long series of public opinion surveys on citizen participation in democratic processes, conducted by the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA). These findings are complemented—and given a comparative perspective—by the results of international surveys such as the European Social Survey (in which our Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory participates), Eurobarometer, and others. This allows us to observe how trends evolve and where Serbia stands relative to other countries.
Despite the significant democratic backsliding over the past decade, surprising resilience is observed in the attitudes of Serbian citizens regarding democracy, which remain largely unchanged. Even on basic research questions, our society exhibits a standard split regarding support for democracy versus authoritarian rule. While the system evolves, long-term attitudes remain stable; they fluctuate only temporarily during specific periods, such as elections or acute crises.
However, the fundamental issue lies in how citizens currently understand democracy and authoritarianism. This issue is highly complex. The majority—even among those who cite democracy as the best form of governance—conceive it through a minimalist framework: political parties exist, elections of some sort take place, and whichever party wins exercises power for the next four years until the subsequent election. Issues such as whether electoral conditions are fair, whether authorities observe institutional constraints, whether human rights are respected, and generally what transpires during those four years are deemed less significant.
Equally noteworthy is that supporters of authoritarianism are not entirely opposed to democracy. In research surveys, the largest single cohort of respondents—approximately 30 percent—supports a hybrid model of democracy and authoritarianism, or “democracy with a strong hand,” which mirrors the current situation in Serbia (where the prevailing system of governance is most frequently characterized as competitive authoritarianism or a hybrid regime). A noticeable upward trend in the size of this group has been recorded in recent years.
Institutions of representative democracy—specifically elections and parliament—likewise demonstrate stable levels of trust and distrust. Over 30% of citizens hold a distinctly negative view of elections, maintaining that they are neither free nor fair and are subject to widespread fraud on voting day. A clear political polarization is evident on this issue: opposition voters express a lack of confidence in elections, whereas supporters of the ruling parties rate the electoral process positively.
The general public largely lacks an understanding of the electoral system. Academic and political debates regarding optimal electoral models for Serbia, as well as comparative analyses of systems used in countries like Croatia and Slovenia, fail to reach the broader citizenry. A majority of survey participants incorrectly identify the current system in Serbia as a plurality/majority electoral system.
Conversely, citizens express a clear preference for voting for individual candidates. They dislike the current system of voting for closed party lists and feel they lack influence over who represents them. Nevertheless, due to a lack of sufficient information, they hold no distinct preferences regarding the design of a prospective new electoral system; the proposed alternatives—ranging from majority systems to proportional systems with direct candidate voting—carry little practical meaning for them.
Public attitudes toward parliament are exceptionally negative, both in terms of year-over-year trends and in comparison with other countries, including those in the immediate region. On this issue, polarization between government and opposition voters is minimal, as negative sentiment prevails across the board. The fundamental drivers of this attitude include: members of parliament utilize the assembly for attacks on political opponents rather than acting in the public interest, represent party interests over those of voters, and undermine the reputation of the National Assembly through their conduct. Furthermore, citizens perceive MPs as inaccessible and unresponsive, expecting no reply should they attempt to contact them. A significant portion of respondents also expresses dissatisfaction with parliament’s failure to effectively oversee the executive branch. This indicates an underlying public expectation for the supreme legislative body to fulfill structural roles beyond serving as a rubber stamp for executive initiatives, combined with a perception that elected representatives fail to execute these duties.
This lack of trust in parliament represents a fundamental paradox: despite being the institution closest to the citizenry, it receives the lowest evaluations. All other public institutions—including the President of the Republic, the government, individual ministries, courts, and independent regulatory agencies (whose functions are often poorly understood by the public)—command higher prestige than the National Assembly.
An additional dynamic is that citizens view local parliaments somewhat more favorably. City and municipal assemblies are closer to the population—citizens frequently know local councilors personally—and exhibit lower levels of polarization than central-level institutions, likely because they are removed from the main arena of national political conflict.