Liberal Public Policy

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    Serbia’s Strategic Interest Lies in the West

    Recent developments in international politics have shown that if Serbia wants to fulfill and sustain its strategic interests, it can only do so with Western support. Whether regarding Kosovo, economic growth and investments, or European integration, time and again we see that only through strong relations with Western capitals can Serbia achieve its goals. The myth of Russian or Chinese support for Serbia—whether economic or political—has no grounding in reality, unlike the tangible support coming from the EU and the West as a whole. Nevertheless, this myth, created and propagated by the Serbian ruling elite—particularly over the last decade of rule by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)—now dominates political discourse and public opinion.

    When analyzing the latest GLOBSEC Vulnerability Index for Serbia, it is alarming to observe the level of support for China and Russia, not only among the general population but also within the discourse of the political elite. This should perhaps come as no surprise, given that over the past 10 years, senior state officials—from the president and prime minister to the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs—have offered no public criticism of China, largely praising this non-democratic state where human rights are violated. While Russia has received slightly less overt praise, it too has been spared criticism, with visiting Russian officials consistently receiving exceptional treatment. This includes Vladimir Putin’s 2014 military parade in Belgrade, accompanied by a massive positive campaign across state-controlled media.

    On the other hand, we have witnessed a parallel campaign of attacks aimed at delegitimizing the EU, the US, and the West during the same period. Whether in tabloids or government-controlled television networks, the level of anti-Western “hysteria,” disinformation, and propaganda-driven content originating from Kremlin directives is deeply concerning. Regrettably, this rhetoric is not confined to pro-government “analysts” and commentators; it extends to the highest levels of political leadership who regularly praise Russia and China.

    This rhetoric directly impacts Serbia’s foreign policy decisions. Alignment with the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a requirement that all candidate countries commit to fulfilling, serving as a clear indicator of a nation’s commitment to a values-based foreign policy. Serbia’s CFSP alignment rate was already problematic prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, primarily because Belgrade refused to join declarations directed against non-recognizers of Kosovo or any measures targeted at Russia or China. Consequently, Serbia’s annual alignment rate hovered at a maximum of 60%. Although minor progress was made in late 2021 toward aligning with less controversial EU decisions to offset the overall backlog, this became irrelevant after Serbia refused to align with the EU’s most urgent foreign and security policy measures following February 24, 2022, and the start of the war in Ukraine.

    While the policy of “sitting on two chairs” may have been viable in the period following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it no longer serves Serbia’s national interests today. Serbia holds two core strategic objectives: joining the European Union and securing the best possible solution regarding Kosovo. Neither of these objectives can be achieved if Western capitals doubt the sincerity of Serbia’s leadership to genuinely commit to the European path and its underlying values.

    Even regarding Kosovo, where Serbia publicly boasts of close ties with Russia and China—purportedly relying on them to “protect” Serbian interests via a UN Security Council veto—the primary actionable support comes from the West. This assistance is delivered through KFOR (the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo), EULEX (the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo), and direct diplomatic ties with the administration in Pristina, all of which substantially aid in securing the daily lives of Serbs living in Kosovo. Russia and China possess no practical leverage over the Kosovo leadership and cannot influence Pristina to improve the standing of the Serbian community or engage more constructively in negotiations. Conversely, the United States, the United Kingdom, and key EU member states such as Germany and France maintain direct involvement in Kosovo, ensuring both security and economic stability on the ground.

    Thus, when Petar Petković, Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija of the Government of Serbia, demands that the international community pressure Pristina to implement signed agreements and adopt a more constructive stance—while expressing frustration that a West targeted by Serbian media for a decade is in no rush to comply—no one should be surprised. What concrete steps has the Serbian government taken in recent years to demonstrate that it is a dependable partner? Why should Western governments assist Serbia on this issue when Belgrade has hesitated to support the West in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine? Although Serbia voted in favor of UN resolutions regarding the conflict, it failed to align with a single EU declaration or sanction regime introduced over the subsequent six months. This inaction enabled Kosovo to frame Serbia as a Russian proxy state embodying Putin’s values, while presenting Pristina as a far more reliable partner.

    If Serbia intends to protect its interests regarding Kosovo, it must align with Western powers. If it seeks a realistic path toward EU accession, it must begin acting like a future EU member state. Because these processes are interconnected, progress in one area naturally drives progress in the other. Even a modest shift in public rhetoric, policy execution, and media messaging would go a long way toward rectifying recent short-term policy errors and recovering a lost decade. Reversing dominant public attitudes—which lean nationalistic and anti-Western—will present a clear challenge for any administration. However, the current government led by the SNS has a duty to correct its course if it genuinely intends to protect Serbia’s national interests and secure a stable, prosperous future.

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